![]() Vince Rabago is chairman of the Pima County Democratic Party
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Secretive electronic voting unacceptableTucson, Arizona | Published: 12.18.2007
Opinion by Vince Rabago
A packed courtroom recently watched the trial in the public records election lawsuit of the Pima County Democratic Party v. Pima County Board of Supervisors. The judge will soon decide whether the electronic database containing results of past elections is a public record. This decision will determine the rights of all political parties to examine electronic voting data after an election.
Arizona law gives political parties the important responsibility of overseeing elections. Members of opposing parties participate at every stage. Historically, party observers watched as ballots were hand-counted. But the use of secretive electronic voting technology has effectively ended political parties' direct oversight of the vote count, thwarting the intent of Arizona's elections law.
In today's computer age, it is critical that the political parties have access to electronic voting data to detect irregularities, errors or manipulation. Our democracy is threatened if there is no meaningful public oversight into the "black box" of electronic voting.
In August, California Secretary of State Debra Bowen and top computer scientists from major universities examined all voting equipment and software. They concluded the technology and software did not meet security standards and could easily be hacked by anyone with access to the computer. Days ago, Ohio Secretary of State Jennifer Brunner similarly found that Ohio's voting system carries "serious risks to voting integrity."
Locally, the state's investigation into the 2006 RTA election found no evidence of criminal conduct but concluded that serious security flaws exist in the Diebold software and that the database is susceptible to manipulation. This devastating evaluation undeniably confirms the danger of manipulation or error.
Meanwhile, Pima County fights to keep the database secret, claiming it constitutes a "program," and that software programs are confidential. But we are not seeking the proprietary software program: we are asking for voting data files of past elections, information that rightly belongs to the public.
The county claims that releasing the data from past elections would endanger future elections, citing security flaws and the hypothetical possibility that outside "hackers" could further compromise election software. Experts, including a retired master programmer for the National Security Agency, say there is no such danger.
Allowing political parties access to the electronic voting database after an election will create the best deterrent against tampering by insiders or outsiders. Currently, there is no such oversight —and no deterrent.
Testimony at the trial demonstrates why the public cannot rely on a system based solely on trust. This includes stunning testimony that an Elections Division employee took home the election database on disk for purported safe-keeping during vote counting in past years. Although the employee denies doing this more recently, it is clear that secure elections need oversight, transparency and verification — not blind trust.
Additional testimony revealed that a senior election employee regularly printed summary reports of who was winning or losing during the early voting period, which raises concerns about improper "peeking" at or sharing of early results. The testimony also raised other concerns, from election-related purchases made outside county procurement rules, to the surprising fact that the back-up tape for the RTA election is missing.
Whatever decision is rendered by the judge, Democrats will continue fighting for the people's right to demand that elections are conducted properly with oversight, transparency and accountability.
Contact Vince Rabago at vrabago@pimadems.org.
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