John C. Bersia, who won a Pulitzer Prize in editorial writing for the Orlando Sentinel in 2000, is the special assistant to the president for global perspectives at the University of Central Florida.

Other articles by John C. Bersia:

Candidates must face global issues Russia's resurgence a challenge for West John C. Bersia: U.S. must keep troops stationed on all frontsJohn C. Bersia: PRO: Goss good choice

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On the occasion of the fifth anniversary of the U.S.-led intervention that toppled Saddam Hussein, many people understandably still search for answers. All the more reason, then, for thorough, objective, fact-based assessments about Iraq that clarify the historical record and expand our understanding of how and why we arrived at this conundrum.

Therefore, it is not surprising that criticism has met the Pentagon's apparent reluctance to allow easy access to a newly released study of the Institute for Defense Analyses' Iraqi Perspectives Project, "Saddam and Terrorism: Emerging Insights from Captured Iraqi Documents."

Although defense officials sponsored the report, the document will not be posted online or e-mailed. Interested parties must submit a request and wait for the study to arrive by mail.

Even more distressing to me is the set of conclusions that the report shares after a comprehensive evaluation of more than 600,000 Iraqi documents in the aftermath of the 2003 invasion. According to an executive summary, the study found that:

● No direct connection existed between Saddam and al-Qaida.

● Saddam's regime was involved in regional and international terrorist operations well before the 2003 intervention.

● Major targets of those operations were Iraqi citizens, both at home and in other countries.

● Other targets included non-Iraqis from time to time.

● Saddam directly but cautiously cooperated with certain terrorist groups in alliances of convenience.

● State sponsorship of terrorism in Iraq via recruiting, training and resourcing was routine.

And what?

Anyone with a bit of time, interest and desire to pore through open sources of information about Saddam and Iraq could have drawn similar conclusions long before the conflict started. Indeed, many did. That the new study had access to an unprecedented amount of information is fine, but it does not change anything.

We did not need the review of hundreds of thousands of Iraqi documents to inform us that Saddam and al-Qaida — the proponents of two competing, transnational, ideological, revolutionary ideologies — were fundamentally incompatible.

● Nor to find out that Saddam had long flirted with terrorists and extremists, all the while jealously guarding his position and options.

● Nor to learn that Saddam disproportionately pursued perceived enemies among his nation's own people.

● Nor to realize that Saddam occasionally targeted non-Iraqis outside his country.

● Nor to understand that Saddam romanced certain terrorist groups when it suited his strategies.

● Nor to know that Iraq provided a safe, supportive haven for terrorist activity.

We already knew all that.

Five years into the Iraqi crisis, Americans should be hearing far better than a recap of the obvious, of old news. Furthermore, if defense officials are going to so much trouble to complicate access to tired perspectives, imagine what would happen to a report that stated or implied even more criticism of past conclusions and policies.

After all the haste, inappropriate justifications, poor planning and stubbornness that have characterized U.S. actions in Iraq, Americans are entitled to a break. The best policy is the U.S. government to be honest and straightforward about national-security challenges before, during and after crises.